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Two recent discussions on the relevance of liberal thinking to the politics of the
Muslim world can be related to the alternative research agenda of ‘Applied Islamology’ and
the subsequent, more expansive, ‘Emerging Reason’ Project developed by the leading
French-Algerian scholar of Islam, the late Mohammed Arkoun. His meta-critique of all
forms of thinking provides a suitable framework for the normative concerns of the
philosopher and religious studies specialist Richard Miller. Miller’s assessment of the
relations between violence, religion, and liberal thought fits well into Arkoun’s
anthropological and theological-philosophical analytical triads of ‘Violence, Sacred, Truth’
and ‘Faith, Reason, Truth.’ Likewise, Arkoun’s empirical triad ‘Mind, Society, Power’ bears
a relevance to Fevzi Bilgin’s examination of the appropriation of political liberalism in
Muslim societies.
In order to establish a liberal-theoretical normativity for the use of violence, Miller
explores the philosophical and moral limits of tolerance for religious differences when these
differences derail into atrocities against innocents. His heuristics reflect an abiding interest in
the ethics of war and killing, religion and civic virtue, and a seemingly unshakable
confidence in the resilience of classical liberalism. While engaging in conversation with
present-day thinkers (such as John Rawls, Richard Rorty, Charles Taylor, and Michael
Walzer), John Stuart Mill, and other heirs of the Enlightenment era loom large in the
background of Miller’s work. Looking at the roster of intellectuals with whom Miller
disagrees and the arguments he uses to justify his dissent, it is difficult to resist the
impression that Miller’s insistence on finding a theoretical foundation for his ethics takes him
to a level of abstraction reminiscent of Kant’s autonomy of the individual.
Perhaps this desire to maintain consistency at all costs also explains the glaring blind
spot that undermines Miller’s argumentation: the failure to acknowledge that the kind of
liberal theory he advocates does not provide the neutral fixed point from which to develop a
universally valid moral philosophy. Although at one point, he notes that any encounter with
others cannot be value-neutral because any encounter necessarily involves a negotiation
between ‘romantic’ valorization and dismissive chauvinism, for the most part there is a lack
of appreciation for the fact that his own account, too, belongs to a discursive formation
shaped by the historicity and cultural particularities of Western thinking.
Miller raises high expectations with his admirable ambition “to think normatively about
religious violence” (p. 2). In order to determine the moral quality of a society, he aims to
offer “reasons for speaking confidently in defense of liberal principles and practices in
response to religiously authorized calumny and terroristic activities” (p. 4). The motivating
force driving this intellectual project is the conviction that ideas can make a tangible
contribution to politics by providing “enduring normative matters surrounding human
dignity, religion and terrorism” (p. 5). Finding the required standards of assessment for such
ethical issues imlies a need for a way of thinking at the limits of toleration—a central tenet of
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liberal political doctrine, according to Miller—by articulating the tensions this creates with
the concepts of resentment and indignation.”
Presenting his attempt as an exercise in “liberal social criticism,” the way Miller
contrasts his approach with other varieties of social criticism considerably dampens the hope
for a universal normativity, as his reification of liberal theorizing retains a distinctly AngloSaxon slant. His excellent engagement with historical social criticism through an examination
of Islamic ‘Just War’ theory opened up an opportunity for a constructive engagement with the
Islamic tradition. Unfortunately, this chance is insufficiently exploited in the remainder of the
book. Miller rightly signals the propensity of classical Islamic legal reasoning to tolerate
pluralism, an attitude that was largely lost in late thinking. He could have made more of the
need to find suitable Muslim interlocutors and consolidate their position in the highly
contentious intellectual milieus of the modern Muslim world. Unfortunately, he loses himself
in a discussion of Islamic jus in bello (rules of engagement during conflict) rather than the
meta-narrative of the highly contested Jihad doctrine. Complaining that “Islamic teachings
about war congeals around this problem of vagueness,” Miller’s own narrative also hedges all
its bets on presenting a counter theory, rather than a more pragmatic approach in tandem with
effective legal instruments.
It is for this reason that the argumentation of one of the exponents of relativist social
criticism challenged by Miller actually strikes me as more convincing: I subscribe to the same
“skepticism about liberal political theory and Enlightenment philosophy more generally” as
Stanley Fish does (34). Miller, by contrast, disagrees with what he calls the multiculturalists’
suspicion of conceptual neutrality and insistence that “purportedly impartial perspectives
mask ideological interests.” He also has a problem with their claim—supported by historical
and economic social criticisms that Miller also does not like— “that our thought forms and
ideals are contingent the product of social, economic, and political forces, not an outgrowth
of reason operating in some pristine, contemplative sanctuary” (33-34). Although he
dismisses Fish’s criticism of the “abstract vocabulary of fairness, mutual respect, toleration,
and so on” as polemical, Miller does “grant some merit” to Fish’s “pre-chosen partisan
vision,” which challenges Americans’ quick condemnation of Muslim extremism and
simultaneous naiveté “regarding their own moral and political faults” (35). In a similar vein,
he also turns against internalist social critiques by such figures as Susan Sontag, who has
addressed exactly those kinds of inconsistencies and contradictions.
While Miller, in turn, has a point in criticizing Fish’s confusion of universal with
absolute standards, I remain in agreement with the latter’s rejection of the kind of “strong
liberalism” advocated by Miller. I believe Fish is right when he observes that “[strong
liberalism] abstracts from substantive matters in everyday life, leaving such theory powerless
to guide real politics and action” (37). As shall become clear later on, to avoid this
discrepancy between theorizing and application, Fevzi Bilgin proposes a political liberalism
with a much narrower scope as an alternative for what Miller has termed the “comprehensive
liberalism” of the classical theorists.
It is Miller’s premise to ground his proposed moral outlook in the liberal tradition
without accounting for its historicity that turns an otherwise well-formulated and thoughtful
argument for a consistent ethics seeking to preserve every individual’s right to life and
security into the purely academic and abstract exercise against which Fish cautions. Miller is
certainly right that certain forms of aggression are “so transparently wrong that any moral
theory seeking to justify [these forms of aggression disqualifies itself as implausible” (47),
but at the same time, his proposed “second-order inquiry” becomes sometimes so regressive
that it undermines its relevance to practice. Here, we could draw a parallel with the pragmatic
theory of non-violence as espoused by the political scientist Chaiwat Satha-Anand because
the moral imperative of the Gandhian alternative is simply not attainable for most people.
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How firmly Miller remains grounded in classical liberalism becomes clear from the
way he transposes the commonsense understanding of human rights derived from Locke’s
analogy to property right into the kind of autonomous morality based on the Kantian
imperative that “persons as moral subjects deserve respect as ends in themselves.” At the
same time, he rightly notes how precarious such an ethics is because “each of us depends on
social, political, and cultural conditions that others put at risk.” If such situations occur, then,
according to Miller, communities are allowed to resort to violence. He also adds the caveat
that any metaphysical individualism remains incomplete because we “do not develop our
lives in isolation but in dialogue with others.” However, Miller makes more of the
“intergenerational dialogue that both creates and presupposes social customs, political
institutions, and cultural traditions” than the fact that civil society is not “reducible to ethnic
or cultural solidarity” (58-9). As a result, the significance of intercultural exchanges remains
underamplified.
I stress this point because it is central to the contrast between Miller’s liberal theory
and the ideas of two of his interlocutors: Richard Rorty and Charles Taylor. In the chapter on
“toleration, equality, and the burden of judgment,” Miller criticizes Rorty’s pragmatist theory
for its acceptance of toleration as a seemingly “Western and parochial norm.” I am not so
sure that this qualification exposes the latter to the charge of overlooking the value of
universal human rights standards for “regulating how people from different traditions and
cultures deal with each other in cross-cultural situations.” Miller’s allegation that “Rorty’s
postmodern bourgeois liberalism risks sacrificing one’s entitlement to (receiving) respect
from others” strikes me as exaggeratedly alarmist (71).
I have the same questions regarding Miller’s reservations towards Charles Taylor, a
thinker who has done more for the philosophical contemplation of inter-cultural encounters
and its implications than anyone else. Taylor’s hermeneutical criticism (89ff.) strikes me as a
more plausible procedure for avoiding both the dangers of ethnocentrism and “recognition on
demand” (93) than Miller’s return to Kant and Mill as “standard-bearers for the politics of
dignity.” Instead, Miller should have engaged in more detail with “spokespersons for the
politics of difference” such as Rousseau, Herder, and Fanon (91). Taylor’s solution for
avoiding both ethnocentrism and undue admiration of exoticism rests on two claims:
Proposing a leap of faith, there is what he calls (1) the “weaker claim” that “all cultures that
have animated whole societies over some considerable stretch of time have something
important to say to all human beings” (93) and (2) the “stronger claim,” which draws on the
“fusion of horizons” proposed in Gadamer’s hermeneutics. While willing to subscribe to the
weaker claim, Miller finds the stronger one unnecessary; the required “new vocabularies of
comparison” and the resultant “transformation of standards” are simply too much to ask,
according to Miller (94-95). This last objection only makes sense if indeed the suggested
transformation does not lead to “a mutual transformation of norms” (97). Miller is absolutely
right in rejecting “patriarchy, racial supremacism, religious discrimination and zealotry,
ecologically doubtful customs and other illiberal sentiments.” I am just not so sure that the
professed humility instilled by the weaker claim is reflected in Miller’s liberal theory.
Instead, a philosophical anthropology undergirding mutual respect for dignity and
human rights can be found in the earlier-mentioned fusion of horizons, involving a “wider
array of moderate and moderating voices” from the Muslim world than Miller is entertaining
in his book (102). His subsequent focus on the works of Maududi and Sachedina (instead of
some other names he mentions such as Abdullahi an-Na’im, Khalid Abou El Fadl,
Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohamed Talbi, Amina Wadud and Abdurrahman Wahid), as well as
his reticence towards giving up the theory of comprehensive liberalism, does not put us on
the right track for the required meeting of the minds. In fact, I think that an “intellectual
holist” like Michael Walzer has a point when casting doubt on the possibility of “detaching
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thin from thick morality,” insisting that both “are products of social history, thick being prior
to thin” (122).
It is this troublesome dependency that also lies at the core of Fevzi Bilgin’s attempt to
“offer a normative framework for the proper place of religion in public life” in a world that
has not just seen horrific atrocities supposedly in the name of religion, but also a more
sustained and not always violent “resurgence of religious—especially Islamic—claims in
public life” (1). Heavily relying on John Rawls’ more recent Political Liberalism (1996)
rather than his seminal A Theory of Justice (1971), in which religion is almost entirely absent,
Bilgin wants to examine the appeal of political liberalism to Muslim societies for “the
accommodation of diverse religious and nonreligious views in a just and stable public order.”
At the same time, he wants to determine the limitations of political liberalism given the fact
that “only the United States could possibly satisfy Rawls’s sociological requirement” (3).
The challenges that religious demands pose to the foundations of liberalism led Rawls to
elaborate a “political conception of justice and overlapping consensus” (5). Whereas Miller
did not push far enough in exploring the latter as the desideratum of cosmopolitan legitimacy
(102), Bilgin puts such an exploration at the core of his investigation and is more optimistic
about its potential, saying:
. . .political liberalism introduces novel approaches to the issues of
political morality, social consensus, and legitimacy, and presents a
promising outlook with regard to religious and secular
confrontations in democratic societies. . . . In fact, Muslim
societies have always had strong religious traditions that are active
and prevalent in public life. (5)
Whereas it is true that most Muslim societies have not experienced the kind of wars of
religion that ripped apart early modern Europe before Europe embarked on the prolonged
periods of secularization that many parts of the Islamic world have by now also begun
experiencing, the fact that most Muslim states have very little experience with democracy is a
serious challenge for Bilgin’s argument in favor of the effectiveness of Rawls’s political
liberalism. Bilgin intends to make a case for the deployment of political liberalism in Muslim
societies by reconstructing the relationship between its sociological assumptions and its
normative principles.
In comparison to Miller’s “strong liberalism,” the “liberalism light” promoted by
Bilgin depends on two prerequisites, while his argument hinges further on two key concepts.
First of all, not dissimilar to Miller’s isolation of reason from its historical, economic, and
cultural conditions, Bilgin insists that a society’s so-called “background culture” must be left
out of the equation (18). Following Habermas, he drops the metaphysical grounding of social
consent, creating instead new normative parameters in tune with the “post-metaphysical
condition” (11). This also means restricting Kant and Mill’s key values of autonomy and
individualism, propagated by comprehensive liberalism to the political dimensions of public
life (19).Thus, the notion of “overlapping consensus,” which remains insufficiently unpacked
in Miller’s theory, becomes the lynchpin for Bilgin’s narrowly-scoped political liberalism.
This core concept is in turn sociologically conditioned by what Rawls called “the fact of
reasonable pluralism” (15).
While central to the argument, reasonable pluralism is also the argument’s Achilles
heel, and Bilgin admits as much later on in the book. While the theoretical structure of
political liberalism is based on the possibility of reasonable pluralism, without which
“Rawls’s idea fails,” Bilgin faces a serious challenge in articulating what, exactly, this
reasonable pluralism consists of, because—“paradoxically, . . . this is the area where Rawls is
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least explicit” (66). More problematically, even in view of the alleged post-metaphysical
condition in which political liberalism operates, critics of Rawls “ascribe a metaphysical
flavor to the notion of reasonableness” (115).
The two core chapters relating political liberalism to Islam and introducing political
Islam in Muslim societies “argue that political liberalism presents an account of political
morality that should be agreeable to most citizens of faith” in that part of the world (32).
Bilgin suggest that political liberalism is inclusivist enough to involve religious believers in
the formation of a political morality, which, in contrast to comprehensive liberalism,
“presents a neutral rather than a secular normative outlook” (32). Rejecting the superiority of
the secular over the religious—as well as the reverse—the regulation of justice by political
liberalism is limited to the domain of basic political, social, and economic structures and thus
“provides a large space for the exercise of religion” (37). A more comprehensive liberal
normativity can only accommodate religion in two ways: via a fragile modus vivendi or via
an oppressive use of state power, which is immoral and illegitimate.
Formulating a convincing argument that the mere acknowledgment of a ‘reasonable
pluralism’ by religiously informed views and doctrines is insufficient, but requires – as Rawls
insists – a ‘wholehearted’ embrace of pluralism, takes even greater effort. In the end, Bilgin
can only point at those instances of moderation of initially radical discourses by ‘numerous
Islamist parties’ (41). The question that remains to be answered is ‘to what extent we can
expect religious believers – including Muslims – around the world to possess the
characteristics described by Rawls?’ (46). This has become an all the more pressing issue in
the face of the diminishing “robustness and explanatory power of secularization theory” and
the need to reconcile liberal theory with the “de-privatization of religion” described by José
Casanova (47-8). Examining the various arenas in which this plays out, Bilgin privileges civil
society over the state and over political society as the site where comprehensive liberalism is
to be replaced by the narrow scope of his political liberalism, instilling a sense of reasonable
pluralism. Turkey is presented as a showcase for this process in the Muslim world. There, we
have seen a shift away from an unabashedly secularist regime with policies allegedly
introduced to defend the rule of law and stimulate modernization, but which effectively
repressed religiously-oriented political parties, by a political party which has managed to
combine a religiously inspired social conservatism with the advocacy of democratization and
civil
What sets Bilgin apart from Miller is his explicit acknowledgement of the Western
roots of liberal thinking. His solution for transcending the historicity of liberalism is to focus
on the socio-political analysis of reasonable pluralism and to make this “the empirical core on
which political liberalism is built.” Putting it even more strongly, the latter’s “normative
component is absolutely based upon the existence and support of the sociological
component” (62). Somewhat over-optimistically, Bilgin even surmises that even if this sociopolitical conditioning “falls short of pluralism, the normative ideal of political liberalism may
still inform democratic pursuits and promote reasonable deliberations among individuals in
settling their difference on constitutional issues” (64).
Like Miller, Bilgin, too, wants to find a firm normative grounding for the required
toleration of religion. Recognizing the multifaceted nature of religious tolerance and, as noted
earlier, aware of Rawls’s silence on how to instill reasonable pluralism in societies in which
no such grounding has yet been established, Bilgin returns to John Locke’s early essay (1667)
and later letter (1689) on toleration, both of which were developed on the back of Europe’s
history of “religious wars, regime changes, prolonged group conflicts, and a brutal phase of
negotiation and bargaining between political and religious institutions” (71). Bilgin credits
Locke for his ability to combine political philosophy with a “well-illustrated sociology and
psychology of religion” (73), which recognize the “subjectivity of orthodoxy in faith” (74).
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This combination informed Locke’s insight into “the inwardness of belief and outwardness of
force, and the contradiction between them.” Political power being everywhere the same and
claiming authority over religion will invite conflict. Therefore, “the burden of [religious]
toleration mostly falls on the political authority” (80). The classical liberal solution of
separating state and religion and the “paradoxical nature of secularist policies” have actually
led to “a more politicized religion” (85). To escape from this dilemma, Bilgin also looks at
classical liberal thinking, in this case, Adam Smith’s advocacy of the impartiality of the state.
What is also insufficiently unpacked in Bilgin’s elaborations of classical liberal thought is
how exactly Rawls’ political liberalism will ensure that the state’s recognition of the freedom
of its citizens is reciprocated by the consent and affirmation of politically liberal principles on
the part of religion. The question that remains unanswered, in other words, is “What
convinces adherents of religions that affirming such principlesl is the reasonable thing to
do?”
Miller and Bilgin’s confidence in the ability of liberal political systems to ensure a
reciprocal respect for human dignity and associated rights in pluralist societies and a
globalizing world is vindicated by the absence of more convincing alternatives. However,
their attempts to establish a universally valid normative basis are less successful. Extremist
ideologies underlying totalitarianism on the left and right were rightly discredited and
rejected on moral grounds. Perhaps the post-metaphysical condition of the present also
requires the dismissal of both comprehensive and narrowly-scoped political liberalism on
practical grounds. If “the center cannot hold,” then the skeptical, pragmatic, and
hermeneutical approaches of Fish, Rorty, and Taylor are possibly more in tune with the
emergent post-ideological epoch and would be better able to fashion something workable out
of the “crooked timber of humanity.”

